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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FLYING DIAMOND CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
ANTHON RUST, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
UTAH MINING ASSOCIATION, 
Amicus Curiae,, 
CASE NO. 14338 
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit by an Oil and Gas Lessee against the owner 
of the surface estate seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting 
the owner of the surface estate from interfering with the establishment 
and operation of drilling operations on the property and, also, 
seeking damages resulting from interference already caused by 
the surface owner; the surface owner counterclaimed seeking 
compensation for the Lessee's use of the surface claiming it to 
be not reasonably necessary, a taking of property and destructive 
of the surface owner8s use of the property. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a trial of the matter the trial court dismissed the 
complaint and held that the surface owner was entitled to damages 
for the property "taken" by the lessee for the location of its 
well site and access road, for damage to crops growing on the 
property, and for damage caused to the surface by the unreasonable 
location of the lessee's access road. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
It is the position of the Utah Mining Association that the 
trial court did not apply the correct rule of law to the facts 
presented on the record and that the Utah Supreme Court should 
adopt the rule set forth herein and remand the case to the trial 
court for reconsideration in light of the proper rule, or in the 
alternative that the Court apply the rule set forth herein and 
enter a judgment in accordance therewith, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Utah Mining Association is a non-profit trade association 
whose membership is composed of companies and individuals that 
produce most of the metals, coal and industrial and agricultural 
minerals mined in the state and includes manufacturer's and 
suppliers in Utah who provide goods and services to the mineral 
industry. Because of the obvious interest that the Association 
has in maintaining a favorable atmosphere for the mineral interests 
and industries in the State of Utah and because of the Association's 
interest in establishing legal precedents in the mining and 
mineral law of the State of Utah which are clear, unambiguous 
and in conformity with principles of mining and mineral law 
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generally accepted in the United States, the Association has 
sought permission to file this Amicus Brief. It is the belief 
of the Utah Mining Association that the Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law and the Memorandum Decision of the trial 
court are both ambiguous and out of step with generally recognized 
principles of. mining and mineral law. 
In its Findings of Facts the trial court found that the 
defendant-respondent had acquired surface rights in the subject 
parcel of land by a deed which specifically reserved to the 
grantors "all gas, oil and other mineral rights." [Exhibit 2]. 
The trial court further found that the plaintiff-appellant was 
the successor in interest to the mineral rights reserved by 
defendant-respondent's grantors pursuant to the terms of an oil 
and gas lease. [Exhibit 3]. As the holder of the mineral 
rights the plaintiff-appellant sought to commence drilling 
operations on the 40 acre tract of which defendant-respondent 
was the surface owner. On January 13, 1974, the plaintiff-
appellant entered the property and commenced the preparation of 
the drill site. Defendant-respondent and the Sheriff of Duchesne 
County refused to allow the preparation to continue and ordered 
plaintiff-appellant from the property. [T.14, 16]. On February 
6, 1974, a preliminary injunction restraining defendant-respondent 
from further interference with plaintiff-appellant's establishment 
of an oil and gas well drill site and access road on the property 
issued. [R. 46,17]. Pursuant to the injunction plaintiff-
appellant put in the access road and drill site as shown on the 
plat map. [Exhibit 4]. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED 
THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED RULE THAT THE 
MINERAL ESTATE IS DOMINANT OVER THE 
SURFACE ESTATE AND CARRIES WITH IT THE 
RIGHT TO USE AS MUCH OF THE SURFACE AS 
IS REASONABLY NECESSARY FOR THE ENJOY-
MENT OF THE MINERAL INTEREST 
The generally recognized and accepted rule setting forth 
the respective rights of the owners of the mineral estate and 
the surface estate has been stated as follows: 
"An oil and gas lease carries with it the right 
to possession of the surface to the extent reasonably 
necessary to enable the lessee to perform the obligations 
imposed upon him by the lease. ?This rule is based 
upon the principle that when a thing is granted all 
the means to obtain it and all the fruits and effects 
of it are also granted.' Accordingly, the right to 
such use of the surface is implied if it is not 
granted, whether the form of conveyance is a mineral 
deed or a lease." 4 Summers, OIL AND GAS, § 652 at 2-
5 (1962). 
The rule has been similarly recognized and explained in the 
following: 
"The permissible interests that may be created in 
oil and gas are best identified and understood by 
beginning with fee simple absolute ownership of land. 
A/ the owner in fee absolute of Blackacre, has the 
same rights, privileges, powers and immunities with 
regard to the minerals therein as he has in the surface, 
subject of course to regulation under the police power 
:of the state. This totality of interest may be granted 
or reserved separate and apart from the surface, and 
such severance of minerals from surface interest 
creates what is called here a mineral estate, being 
the most complete ownership of oil and gas recognized 
in law. The owner of the mineral estate (B) has the 
same rights, privileges, powers, and immunities as A 
had before him: with respect to the minerals, B 
stands in in the shoes of A. 1 Williams and Meyers, 
OIL AND GAS LAW, § 301 at 431-32 (1975). 
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In this case, the owner of the property (mineral and surface) 
conveyed the surface to defendant-respondent and retained the 
mineral estate to himself. In retaining to himself the mineral 
estate the defendant-respondent's grantor certainly could not 
have intended to place the mineral estate beyond his own reach. 
The retention of the mineral estate implies a retention of the 
right to use so much of the surface as is reasonably necessary 
to the development and enjoyment of the estate retained. As the 
successor in interest to the rights retained by defendant-
respondent's grantor, the plaintiff-appellant stands in the 
shoes of the grantor and may properly exercise every right 
retained by the grantor. The plaintiff-respondent, therefore, 
possesses the right to enter upon and use so much of the surface 
as is reasonably necessary to the development and enjoyment of 
the mineral estate. The surface owner suffers no injury in this 
as he bargained for, paid for and obtained the surface rights 
subject to the retained mineral estate. This is evidenced in 
his deed and in interfering with the plaintiff-respondent's 
development and enjoyment of the mineral estate the defendant-
respondent is exercising right and authority over the mineral 
estate which he does not and never has possessed. 
The above cited authorities and argument do not rest upon 
scholarly jurisprudence alone but rather have developed from a 
long line of cases beginning in the common law of England and 
carrying forward to the present. This Court has not had occasion 
to rule on this matter previously, but it is worthwhile to note 
-q-
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that under the common law of England the mineral estate was 
recognized as the dominant estate and the owner of the mineral 
estate had the right to use the surface to extract the minerals. 
Ferguson, SEVERED SURFACE AND MINERAL ESTATE - RIGHT TO USE, 
DAMAGE OR DESTROY THE SURFACE TO RECOVER MINERALS, 19 Rocky Mt. 
Mineral Law Inst., 411 at 412-414 (1974). The Utah Legislature has 
adopted the common law insofar as it has been generally recognized 
and enforced in this country and is suitable to conditions 
within the state. 
"The common law of England so far as it is not 
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution or 
laws of the United States, or the Constitution or 
laws of this state, and so far only as it is con-
sistent with and adopted to the natural and physical 
conditions of this state and the necessities of the 
people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the 
rule of decision in all courts of this state." 
Utah Code Ann., §68-3-1 (1968). 
Of course, it is not urged that the dominant estate theory 
known to English common law is in effect in this state as it 
then existed? however, it is a starting place for the development 
of the rule as it should be applied in Utah. Most states have 
modified the common law rule by placing the limitation upon the 
dominant mineral estate that its dominance extend only to such 
use of the surface as is "reasonably necessary" for the mineral 
development. A review of relevant law on this subject reveals 
that most states have adopted a theory that the mineral estate 
is dominant with the "reasonable necessity" limitation. 
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Deese, 153 So. 2d. 614 (Ala. 1963), 
the Alabama Court refused to uphold a jury verdict granting the 
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surface owner compensation for damage caused by the mineral 
owner's operation of an oil and gas well on adjacent property. 
The mineral owner had leveled and graded the well site, had cut 
trees and removed fences, part of which were on plaintiff's 
property. The mineral owner owned the oil and gas under several 
lots. Under a pool agreement, the well was located on a lot 
adjacent to and overlapping upon the plaintiff's surface interest. 
The Court questioned why the surface owner should have to suffer harm 
when he did not share in the ownership of oil under his land. 
"If he does not own any interest in the oil, and 
hence receives no benefit from its production, then 
why should his surface interest be burdened by action 
taken in recovering the oil? The obvious answer is 
that he acquired the surface subject to the right of 
the owner of the oil thereunder to use the surface in 
such manner as is reasonably necessary to recover the 
oil." 153 So.2d at 618-19. 
The Court concluded that since the owner of the oil had a right 
to enter the plaintiff's surface estate there had been no trespass 
and no damage. 
In Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Wood, 403 SW2d 54 (Ark.1966), 
the owner of the mineral interest used the water from the surface 
owner's stock pond and left it dry. The Court held that the use 
of the surface by the mineral owner was in excess of that which 
was reasonably necessary and sustained an award of damages to 
the surface owner. The Court stated: 
"It is true that an oil and gas lease gives with it 
the right to possession of the surface to the extent 
reasonably necessary to enable a lessee to perform the 
obligations imposed upon him by the lease. This 
includes the right to enter upon the premises and use 
-7-
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so much of it, and in such manner, as may be reasonably 
necessary to carry out the terms of the lease and 
effectuate its purpose." 403 SW2d at 55. 
The Court concluded that the unreasonable use by the lessee in 
the case was shown by substantial evidence. 
In MacDonnell v. Capital Co., 130 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1942), 
the Circuit Court applied California law in holding that an oil 
and gas lessee did not commit a trespass by entering upon the 
surface estate to commence drilling operations and that the 
surface owner had no right to recover damages for the destruction 
of the surface so long as the lessee followed the usual or 
customary methods of mining. The Court held: 
"We are satisfied that the reservation of the mineral 
rights in the deed . . . gave it the right to enter 
the premises and to remove the minerals in a manner 
consistent with proper oil field practice." 130 F.2d at 
320. 
In Charles F. Haynes & Assoc, Inc. v. Blue, 233 So.2d 127 
(Miss.1970), the Mississippi Court held that the surface owner 
was not entitled to recover damages caused to the surface when 
the wall of a slush pit broke causing spillage. The Court noted 
that the surface owner might have recovered had negligence been 
shown but that there was no evidence of negligence. 
"We have also pointed out that the oil company, lessee, 
had a right to go upon the land for all reasonable 
purposes to explore and drill for oil and gas. . . and 
may use as much of the surface as is reasonably necessary 
to exercise its rights. . . but it cannot intentionally 
or negligently damage or use more of the land surface 
than is reasonably necessary for its mining operation." 
233 So.2d at 128. 
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In Sun Oil Co, v, Whitaker, 483 SW2d 808 (Tex. 1912), the 
owner of the mineral estate was using water from its own wells 
drilled upon the property to inject into its oil wells to increase 
the pressure,, The surface owner argued that Sun Oil had no 
right to use the water and that it greatly decreased the value 
of the surface estate. The Court held: 
"The oil and gas lessee's estate is the dominant 
estate and the lessee has an implied grant, absent an 
express provision for payment, of free use of such 
part and so much of the premises as is reasonably 
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease, 
having due regard for the rights of the owner of the 
surface estate. [citations omitted] The rights 
implied from the grant are implied by law in .all 
conveyances of the mineral estate and, absent an 
express limitation thereon, are not to be altered by 
evidence that the parties to a particular instrument 
of conveyance did not intend the legal consequences of 
the grant. 
The implied grant of reasonable use extends to 
and includes the right to use water from the leased 
premises in such amount as may be reasonably necessary 
to carry out the lessee's operations under the lease. 
483 SW2d at 810-11. 
Finally, in Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 61 SE2d 633 
(W.Va. 1950), in a case dealing directly with the right of a mineral 
owner to place an access road on the surface, the West Virginia 
Court held that even though the establishment of such a road was 
damaging to the surface it was "damnum absque injuria" since the 
mineral owner had the right to use so much of the surface as was 
reasonably necessary. 
"The defendant had the right to build a road if the same 
was reasonable and necessary for the production and 
transportation of gas. . . . [citation omitted] The 
owner of the minerals underlying land possesses, as 
_Q_ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
incident to this ownership, the right to use the 
surface in such manner and with such means as would be 
fairly necessary for the enjoyment of the mineral 
estate.'" 61 SE2d at 635. 
The above cited cases are cited by way of illustration and 
are by no means all inclusive. A number of other states have 
recognized the general rule urged above. See, e.g., Illinois Basin 
Oil Association v. Lynn, 425 S.W.2d 555 (Ky. App. Ct. 1968); 
East v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 168 So.2d 426 (La. App. 
Ct. 1964); McLeod v. Cities Service Gas Co., 131 F.Supp. 449 
(D.C.D. Kan. 1955); Hurley v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 455 P.2d 
321 (Mont. 1969); Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829 
(N.D.1969); Flowler v. Delaplain, 87 N.E. 260 (Ohio 1909); 
and Davon Drilling Company v. Ginder, 467 P.2d 470 (Okla. 1970). 
The above cited cases cut two ways. In some, the surface 
owner has been compensated for an unreasonable use of the surface 
by the mineral owner, while in others the surface use has been found 
reasonable and no compensation has been allowed. The important 
point in the above cited cases and authorities is that they 
apply a uniform principle of law. 
It is, therefore, urged that this Court adopt a principle 
of law to govern this case and to establish a precedent in Utah 
which is in conformity with the authorities cited above. Such a 
principle should provide for the following considerations: (1) 
That the mineral estate is dominant over the surface estate; 
because without such dominance the mineral estate would become 
valueless to its owner; because the surface owner has notice of 
-10-
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the mineral interest as contained in the grant or reservation 
creating it and his bargain takes into consideration such out-
standing interests; and because when a mineral interest is 
granted or retained it can only be implied that the grantor or 
retainer intended to also grant or retain the means reasonably 
necessary to obtain what he has granted or retained; (2) That 
the dominance of the mineral estate should not be absolute, else 
the surface owner could be unjustly and unnecessarily deprived 
of valuable property and valuable resources could be needlessly 
wasted; (3) That the proper limitation to place upon the dominant 
mineral estate is that the mineral estate may only enter upon, 
use, destroy, or damage the surface to an extent reasonably 
necessary to discover and recover the minerals; and (4) That the 
dominance of the mineral estate can be limited, controlled, or 
given up by specific agreement of the parties in the deed or 
lease granting or retaining the estate. 
The adoption of the above outlined principles by this Court 
would promote the orderly development of the mineral industry in 
Utah while at the same time protecting the reasonable interest 
of the surface owners. It maintains a balance in the proper use 
of all resources and provides an incentive for mineral owners 
and surface owners to act reasonably and with necessary constraint. 
POINT II 
THE OPINION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS AMBIGUOUS AS 
TO WHAT RULE OF LAW WAS APPLIED BUT DOES NOT 
APPEAR TO HAVE APPLIED THE RULE SET FORTH 
IN POINT I ABOVE OR TO HAVE PROPERLY OR 
CONSISTENTLY APPLIED ANY RECOGNIZED RULE. 
-11-
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The counterclaim of the defendant-respondent sought damages 
based upon four separate theories: (1) That the plaintiff-
appellant as the mineral owner had no right to enter upon or 
commence drilling operations using the surface; (2) That the 
plaintiff-appellant's use of the surface constituted a taking by 
eminent domain; (3) That the plaintiff-appellant's use of the surface 
was not reasonably necessary; and (4) That under the terms of the 
oil and gas lease plaintiff-appellant was required to compensate 
defendant-respondent for the loss of "growing crops theretofore 
planted on said land," 
As to (1) above, the trial court apparently found initially 
that the mineral owner did have the right to enter upon the land 
and commence drilling operations. A preliminary injunction was 
issued by the trial court on February 6, 1974, which enjoined 
the surface owner from interfering with the mineral owner's 
establishment of drilling operations [R. at 46.] The basis for 
the injunction is not set forth but rather it provides that it 
is issued upon the same terms as the restraining order previously 
entered [R. at 17.] The restraining order stated that it appeared 
from the facts set forth in the Complaint that the order should 
issue. In its final order, the trial court dismissed the Complaint 
in its entirety [R.at 72.] No mention is made as to the status 
of the preliminary injunction issued on February 6, 1974, so it 
must be presumed that it lapsed. 
-12-
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The issue is, therefore, presented whether or not the trial 
court found that plaintiff-appellant had the right to enter upon 
and use the surface. Initially, the Court held that plaintiff-
appellant had the right, for the injunction issued, and the Court 
allowed plaintiff-appellant to enter and establish a well. The 
injunction itself was defective. Rule 65A(d) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure requires that: 
"Every order granting an injunction and every 
restraining order shall be specific in terms; 
shall describe in reasonable detail, and not 
by reference to the complaint or other document 
the act or acts sought to be restrained. . . . " 
[emphasis supplied]. 
Of course, it can be assumed that the injunction issued for the 
correct reason - that the mineral owner possesses the dominant 
estate and has the right to enter and use the surface as is 
necessary to develop the minerals. If this is the case, then it 
is very difficult to reconcile with the rest of the decision, 
and the Court should either remand the case to the trial judge 
for clarification or clarify the matter in its final decision in 
this matter. On the other hand, it appears that the trial 
court's dismissal of the Complaint ended the injunction and 
failed to recognize the rights of the dominant estate. This 
would clearly be error under the authorities cited above and the 
rule recommended to the Court herein. Also, if this is the 
result, the trial court failed to state what rule it was adopting 
and its reasons for doing so. 
-13-
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The second contention of the defendant-respondent was that 
the plaintiff-appellanfs use of the surface in developing the 
minerals was a taking by eminent domain. This is a novel approach 
to the problem. Once again, it must turn upon whether the owner 
of the mineral estate is the owner of a dominant estate. If the 
mineral owner is the dominant owner, then he enters the property 
by right so long as he does nothing which is unreasonable, or 
unnecessary. If the mineral owner enters by right, then he 
takes nothing from the surface owner, and the surface owner is not 
entitled to compensation. 
The trial court's opinion is extremely vague as to how it 
dealt with defendant-respondentfs "taking" argument. The trial 
courtfs Memorandum Decision repeatedly uses the term "taken" and 
granted the defendant-respondent the fair market value of the 
land "taken" in damages. In its motion objecting to the appearance 
of the Utah Mining Association as Amicus Curiae, the defendant-
respondent takes the position that the trial court did not hold: 
"That the holder of a mineral interest is required to 
- compensate the holder of the surface rights in order 
to secure access to the mineral interest for purposes 
of exploration and extraction. To the contrary, the 
trial court held only that, pursuant to the terms of 
the mineral lease involved in this case, the owner of 
the surface rights was entitled to compensation for 
destruction of growing crops as was provided in the 
lease." 
If the argument of the defendant-respondent is correct, then the 
question should be answered as to why the trial judge continually 
refers to the property as being "taken" in his Findings and 
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Decision, and why he awarded as damages the fair market value 
of the property "taken," The value of the crops growing thereon 
could not be the same as the fair market value of the land itself. 
Under the authorities cited in Point I above, it was clearly 
error for the trial court to allow compensation for the "taking" 
of property when plaintiff-appellant had the right to reasonably 
use the surface in locating its well on the property. Damages 
can only be awarded where it is established that the mineral 
owner has used surface not reasonably necessary for the drilling 
operation. In this case, the trial court specifically found 
that the amount of surface used was reasonably necessary for the 
mineral ownerfs operations. [R. 64] If this is the case, then nothing 
was taken from the surface owner. He never possessed the right 
to exclude the mineral owner, and his use of the surface was 
subject to the dominant estate from the day he received his 
interest. 
Some of the confusion in this case may have resulted from 
the fact that Utah is one of four western states that has adopted 
a statutory right of condemnation for mining and oil and gas 
operations. Under the provisions of Utah Code Ann., §78-34-1 
(Supp. 1975), property may be condemned for, inter alia, roads 
and pipelines, for mining and oil and gas operations. The Utah 
statute recognizes that mining is a "public use." The statute, 
however, applies where the mining interest does not already 
possess the right to the use of the surface. One need not take 
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by eminent domain what one already possesses. The purpose of 
the Utah statute has been explained as follows: 
"A frustrating problem that seems to arise most 
frequently in western states occurs when the leased 
premises are isolated . . . and access thereto cannot 
be gained except by crossing the lands of a third 
person. Perhaps unfortunately, one generally does not 
have a way of necessity over lands of a stranger even 
though his lands are completely surrounded by private 
lands, where there is no privity of ownership. In a 
number of western states, [Colorado, Utah, Montana and 
New Mexico] statutes have been enacted authorizing 
acquisition of easements by necessity for mining 
purposes." Gray, A NEW APPRAISAL OF THE RIGHTS OF 
LESSEES UNDER OIL AND GAS LEASES TO USE AND OCCUPY THE 
SURFACE, 20 Rocky Mt. Mineral Law Inst., 227 at 241 
(1975). [information added] 
The Utah statute was enacted precisely to take care of the 
problem described above. It was certainly not enacted to alter 
the status of the mineral estate owner or his rights to enter 
upon and use the surface appurtenant to his estate. 
The third contention raised by the defendant-respondent was 
that the plaintiff-appellant's use of the surface was not reasonably 
necessary. The trial court specifically held that the space 
used by the plaintiff-appellant was reasonably necessary to the 
establishment of the well. This holding simply does not square 
with the award of damages for the space taken. If the surface use 
was reasonably necessary, the mineral owner had a right to its 
use, and there simply was no basis for paying the surface owner 
for the use of the space. 
The trial court did hold that the location of the road was 
not reasonably necessary and awarded damages to the defendant-
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respondent for the injury caused to his land by altering his 
irrigation system. If indeed the location of the road was not 
reasonably necessary, this award would seem to be justified in 
keeping with the rule set forth in POINT I of this Brief. 
However, the trial court stated that it was applying the concept 
of Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 SW2d 618 (Tex. 1971). In the 
Getty case, the surface owner expended a great deal of money in 
placing an elevated irrigation system on its land. The system 
would clear obstacles 7 feet high. Neighbors of Jones had 
similar systems, and oil companies had installed two different 
types of wells on their property which did not interfere with their 
irrigation systems. Getty placed wells on the Jones property but did 
not follow the example of its neighbors. The Getty wells were more 
than 7 feet high and prevented Jones from using his irrigation 
system. 
The Texas Court applied the "reasonable necessity" rule and 
held that the types of wells placed upon the property were not 
reasonably necessary to the mineral owner's enjoyment of its 
estate. The court stated: 
"It is well settled that the oil and gas estate 
is the dominant estate in the sense that use of as 
much of the premises as is reasonably necessary to 
produce and remove the minerals is held to be impliedly 
authorized by the lease; but that the rights implied 
in favor of the mineral estate are to be exercised 
with due regard for the rights of the owner of the 
servient estate. . . The due regard concept defines 
more fully what is to be considered in the determination 
of whether a surface use by the lessee is reasonably 
necessary. There may be only one manner of use of the 
surface whereby the minerals can be produced. The 
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lessee has the right to pursue this use, regardless of 
. surface damage. Kenny v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co. 351 
SW2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App. Waco 1961, writ ref'd). And 
there may be necessitous temporary use governed by the 
same principle. But under the circumstances indicated 
here? i.e., where there is an existing use by the 
surface owner which would otherwise be precluded or 
impaired, and where under the established practices in 
the industry there are alternatives available to the 
lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the 
rules of reasonable usage of the surface may require 
the adoption of an alternative by the lessee." 
470 SW2d at 621-22. 
The Court specified that the due regard idea was merely a means 
of determining reasonable necessity. Under Getty, two elements 
are necessary to establish a lack of due regard for the rights 
of the surface owner. It must be shown that (1) the surface 
owner has n£ reasonable alternatives to his preexisting use and 
(2) that there are reasonable and generally accepted alternatives 
available to the mineral owner on the property. 
Upon rehearing, the Getty Court noted that some confusion 
had been caused by its opinion. The Court clarified its opinion 
by stating: 
"We do not hold that a mineral lessee's surface 
use may be found unreasonable without regard to 
the surface uses otherwise available to the surface 
owner. The reasonableness of the surface use by the 
lessee is to be determined by a consideration of the 
circumstances of both and, as stated, the surface 
owner is under the burden of establishing the un-
reasonableness of the lessee's surface use in this 
light." Id at 627^ [emphasis supplied] 
It is therefore necessary that alternative uses available to the 
surface owner be considered. 
In Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 SW2d 808 (1972), the Texas 
Court further explained and limited Getty. 
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"Our holding in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 SW2d 
618 (Tex. 1971), is not applicable under the facts of 
this case. It is limited to situations in which there 
are reasonable methods that may be employed by the 
lessee on the leased premises to accomplish the 
purposes of this lease." 4 83 SW2d at 812. 
The Utah Mining Association has no objection to the Getty 
rule as it has been explained by the Texas Court. It is urged, 
however, that the Getty rule was not properly applied in this 
case. The defendant-respondent most certainly showed that the 
placement of the road caused damage to an existing use of his 
land and there was conflicting evidence as to whether the plaintiff-
appellant had a reasonable alternative as to the placement of 
the road, but the defendant-respondent did not show that he had 
no alternatives to his pre-existing use of the land. Under the 
guise of the Getty rule, the defendant-respondent in this case 
has asserted the right to dictate to the mineral owner where he 
should place his road. Mere inconvenience to the surface owner 
and conflicting evidence as to alternatives available to the 
mineral owner does not meet the requirements of Getty. In this 
case, it has been established that the mineral owner placed the 
road in a way which required the shortest distance [R. at 27] 
and that the mineral owner placed culverts along the road as 
needed* [T. at 130]. As the Court in Getty pointed out: 
"The reasonableness of the method and manner of using 
the dominant mineral estate may be measured by what 
are usual, customary, and reasonable practices in the 
industry under circumstances of time, place, and 
servient estate uses." Id. at 627. 
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Further, the trial court in Getty instructed the jury that it 
should weigh the harm and inconvenience to the surface owner 
against the alternatives available to the mineral owner. The 
Court specifically found that this was not the proper test. 
"This is not the proper test particularly in 
the suggestion that inconvenience to Jones 
may be a controlling element. There must be a 
determination that under all circumstances the 
use of the surface by Getty in the manner under 
attack is not reasonably necessary. The burden 
of proof is upon Jonesf the surface owner." 
470 SW2d at 623. [Emphasis supplied] 
It may be concluded that Getty turned more upon the fact that 
all the other mineral owners in the area had adopted alternatives 
which would accomodate the type of irrigation system involved, 
than upon the inconvenience suffered by Jones. 
The trial court in this case has focused upon the harm 
suffered by the surface owner, and there is no showing in the 
record that the usual, customary and reasonable practices in the 
industry in the area under all circumstances dictated that the 
mineral owner should have placed his road differently, or that 
the surface owner had no alternatives to the surface use impaired. 
The last point raised by the defendant-respondent was that 
under the terms of the lease it was given the right to recover 
for crops growing upon the land at the time the mineral owner 
required its use. The Utah Mining Association is in complete 
agreement with the principle that limitations may be placed upon 
the dominant estate by the agreement of the parties. There is 
no question in this case that the owner of the dominant estate 
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agreed to pay for "growing crops theretofore planted on said 
land," The question is how growing crops theretofore planted 
could possibly be valued at the fair market value of the land 
itself. The lease does not provide for compensation for crops 
that may be planted in the future but for the use of the 
surface by the mineral owner, nor does the lease provide that 
the mineral owner will purchase the land of the surface owner, 
nor pay him the value of his land without purchasing it. The 
damages to which defendant-respondent is entitled under the 
lease should be determined by valuing the crops planted before 
the mineral owner required the land for his use and growing at 
the time the mineral owner required its use. The value of the 
crops is not the value of the land itself. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Court is urged to adopt the rule which 
recognizes the mineral estate as the dominant estate limited by 
the requirement that in exercising the rights of the dominant 
estate the mineral owner must only use that portion of the 
surface which is reasonably necessary to enable him to enjoy the 
mineral estate. This rule is the rule accepted by most 
states which have dealt with these issues. The rule serves the 
interest of both the mineral estate owner and the surface estate 
owner, while insuring the most effective utilization of resources 
and protection of the environment. 
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The trial court has failed to adhere to the generally 
accepted rule stated above and has further failed to provide an 
< 
adequate basis for its decision in the case and to maintain 
consistency in its decision. The issues in this case should be: 
(1) Did the owner of the mineral estate use only so much of the 
surface as was reasonably necessary for his enjoyment of the 
mineral estate?; (2) Was the location of the access road by the 
mineral owner unreasonably located without giving due regard to 
the rights of the surface owner?; and, (3) What rights were 
granted to the surface owner by the oil and gas lease? 
By applying the recommended rule to these questions, it is 
the position of the Utah Mining Association that a just and 
reasonable decision can be reached. However, since the state of 
the trial court's decision and the record indicate a great deal 
of confusion, it would be in the best interest of the parties 
for the Court to remand this case to the trial court with instructions 
regarding the correct rule to be applied. This course is recommended 
because of the lack of evidence in the record as to whether the 
mineral owner used due regard in the placement of its access 
road. New evidence could be taken and under the proper rule the 
issue could be satisfactorily resolved. Further, the trial 
court would be given an opportunity to correct or justify its 
ruling in regard to the award of damages to the surface owner 
for the mineral owners use of the surface. 
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The matter should be remanded to the trial court with 
instructions as to the correct rule to be applied. 
Respectfully submitted this Q/ day of March, 1976. 
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